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CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 26.1(a), ACA International states that it does not
have a parent corporation, nor is there any publicly held corporation holding ten
percent (10%) or more of ACA International’s stock.
AUTHORITY FOR FILING THIS BRIEF
ACA International has obtained consent to file this amicus curiae brief from
counsel for all of the parties to this appeal. Accordingly, ACA International’s
authority for filing this brief is found at Fed. R. App. P. 29(a).
STATEMENT OF INTEREST
ACA International (“ACA”), formerly known as the American Collectors
Association, Inc., is the international trade association for credit and collection
professionals. ACA’s members provide a wide variety of accounts receivable
management services.1

Headquartered in Minneapolis, Minnesota, ACA

represents the interests of approximately 5,300 third-party collection agencies,
attorneys, credit grantors and vendor affiliates.
ACA members comply with all applicable federal and state laws and
regulations concerning debt collection, as well as the ethical standards and
guidelines promulgated by ACA. Specifically, the collection activity of ACA
1

While the debt collection activities of ACA members do not meet the definition
of “telemarketing” found at 16 C.F.R. §310.2(cc), consumers routinely appear to
operate under the mistaken belief that creditors and their agents are somehow
subjected to the auspices of the national do-not-call registry.
1

members is regulated primarily by the Federal Trade Commission (the
“Commission”) pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (the “FDCPA”),
15 U.S.C. §1692 et seq., and the Fair Credit Reporting Act (the “FCRA”), 15
U.S.C. §1681 et seq., in addition to analogous state laws.
In addition, ACA members who handle accounts receivable for medical
service providers comply with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act (“HIPAA”) including the Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable
Health Information codified at 45 CFR Parts 160 and 164 (the “Privacy Standard”).
Finally, ACA members who purchase debt comply with the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act (the “GLBA”), 15 U.S.C. §§6801 et seq.
In addition to working under the auspices of various laws and regulations
dealing with consumer privacy such as the FDCPA, the FCRA, the HIPAA Privacy
Standard, and the GLBA, ACA members are also heavily involved in telephone
contact with consumers.

ACA members engage in hundreds of millions of

telephone calls with consumers each year on behalf of creditors. As such, ACA
has closely monitored developments in the area of do-not-call lists.
As part of such monitoring, ACA submitted comments in response to the
Commission’s Notice of Proposed Rulemaking concerning amendments to the
Telemarketing Sales Rule codified at 16 C.F.R. §§310 et seq. The Commission
promulgated its final amendments to the Telemarketing Sales Rule on January 29,
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2003. Telemarketing Sales Rule; Final Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 4580 et seq. (January
29, 2003) (the “Final TSR”).
As an international trade association whose members are heavily regulated
by privacy related laws and regulations, and at the same time heavily involved in
telephone contacts with consumers, ACA respectfully submits this brief as amicus
curiae. ACA does not support either party through the submission of this brief, but
rather, hopes to aid this Court in resolution of the appeal at bar through the
provision of insight into the issues raised by the Final TSR and the FCC Rules.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Commission, through the implementation of a national do-not-call
registry, has sought to protect the privacy rights of consumers.

Clearly, the

protection of consumer privacy rights is a substantial government interest.
However, it is equally clear that commercial free speech is also a substantial
interest entitled to certain protections.
One of the issues presented for this Court on appeal is whether the
provisions of the Final TSR establishing the national do-not-call registry have been
narrowly tailored enough so as to strike the appropriate balance between consumer
privacy rights and the commercial free speech rights of telemarketers. Restrictions
on commercial free speech that are not sufficiently narrowly tailored to achieve a
substantial government interest can not pass constitutional muster.

3

ACA’s concern is that the provisions of the Final TSR establishing the
national do-not-call registry may be deemed by this Court as not narrowly tailored
enough to achieve the government’s stated interest, and therefore unconstitutional.
A finding of unconstitutionality would likely result in further legislative efforts by
Congress to recreate the national do-not-call registry. Herein lies ACA’s greatest
concern—that in the event of further legislation concerning the establishment of a
national do-not-call registry, the scope and applicability of the provisions of the
Final TSR may be allowed to escape the strict confines of telemarketing calls.
In the event that this Court deems the provisions of the Final TSR
establishing the national do-not-call registry to be unconstitutional, ACA hopes
that this Court will provide guidance as to alternatives that this Court would
consider constitutional. Such guidance may possibly include the less restrictive
alternatives available to achieve the goal of protecting consumer privacy such as
the approach to allowing consumers to cease communications employed by the
FDCPA, or the company-specific do-not-call list approach adopted in the original
Telemarketing Sales Rule. ACA hopes that such guidance would also state the
importance of ensuring that the national do-not-call list not spill over from
telemarketing calls into other arenas such as collection calls on behalf of creditors
who have delivered goods or performed services, but have not been paid for such
goods or services.

4

ARGUMENT
I.
An Issue Exists as to Whether the Provisions of the Final TSR are
Constitutional
A.
Has the Government Demonstrated that the Proposed Restriction
on Commercial Speech Directly and Materially Advances the Government’s
Stated Substantial Interest?
Resolution of the appeal at bar requires an examination and balancing of the
privacy rights of consumers and the commercial free speech rights of the business
community. The Commission clearly realized this when it stated:
Similarly, by directing that the Commission regulate the times when
telemarketers could make unsolicited calls to consumers in the second
enumerated item [footnote 393—15 U.S.C. 6102(a)(3)(B)], Congress
recognized that telemarketers’ right to free speech is in tension
with consumers’ right to privacy within the sanctity of their
homes, but that a balance must be struck between the two that
meshes with consumers’ expectations while not unduly burdening
industry.
68 Fed. Reg. 4613 (emphasis added).
As a trade association whose members are governed by a diverse array of
privacy-related laws and regulations including without limitation, the FDCPA, the
FCRA, the HIPAA Privacy Standard, and the GLBA, ACA is keenly aware of and
supportive of the privacy rights enjoyed by consumers. In addition, as a trade
association whose members spend their work day in communication with
consumers, ACA is equally aware of and supportive of free speech rights.
Accordingly, ACA agrees that the above-referenced tension exists, and further
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agrees that an appropriate balance must be struck between these two vital and
competing interests.
The question on appeal is whether the proper balance has in fact been struck.
If the government’s own numbers are accepted, the telemarketing industry’s right
to free speech has already been chilled to the tune of over 50 million2 subscribers
to the national do-not-call registry. By all accounts, the number of subscribers to
the national do-not-call registry will continue to grow over time. A question for
this Court’s consideration is whether a regulatory framework that concentrated on
restricting the telemarketing industry’s free speech rights, as opposed to
completely banning such rights, would better serve the Commission’s stated goal
of striking the appropriate balance between consumers’ privacy rights and the
business community’s free speech rights.
In Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corporation v. Public Service
Commission of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 100 S.Ct. 2343, 65 L.Ed.2d 341 (1980),
the Court set forth a four part test for determining the constitutionality of a
restriction on commercial speech.

The Central Hudson Court held that

commercial speech may be regulated if: (1) the speech at issue is not untruthful
and does not concern unlawful activity; (2) the government asserts a substantial
interest in support of the regulation; (3) the government demonstrates that the
2

See, footnote 7.
6

restriction on commercial speech directly and materially advances that interest;
and, (4) the regulation is narrowly tailored. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564-565.
It is the third and fourth prongs of the Central Hudson test that raise the
constitutional issues presently before this Court. This is in large part due to the
dichotomy set forth in the Final TSR for the treatment of commercial
telemarketing calls as opposed to charitable telemarketing calls. As stated by the
Commission itself in the Final TSR:
The Commission believes that the encroachment upon consumers’
privacy rights by unwanted solicitation calls is not exclusive to
commercial telemarketers; consumers are disturbed by unwanted calls
regardless of whether the caller is seeking to make a sale or to ask
for a charitable contribution.
68 Fed. Reg. 4637 (emphasis added). The Commission further stated that “A great
many consumer email comments expressed the view that unsolicited calls disturb
their privacy, and did not distinguish between sales calls and other types of
solicitation calls, such as those for charities.” Id, at footnote 685.
Based upon the Commission’s own commentary to the Final TSR, a
question clearly exists as to whether the Final TSR meets the third part of the
Central Hudson test.
While the Commission’s stated reason for promulgating the national do-notcall registry was clearly the protection of consumer privacy rights, the Commission
stated in a footnote that the national do-not-call registry will also serve the
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substantial government interest of preventing fraud and abuse. 68 Fed. Reg. 4635,
footnote 669. However, even if prevention of fraud and abuse had been the
Commission’s stated goal in promulgating the national do-not-call registry, the
Commission’s own commentary to the Final TSR still calls into question the
constitutionality of the divergent treatment afforded to commercial telemarketers
as opposed to charitable telemarketers. See, 68 Fed. Reg. 4628, footnote 569
(charitable telemarketers refusing to honor requests to be placed on companyspecific do-not-call lists). See also, 68 Fed. Reg. 4585 (“The Commission believes
that concerns about bogus charitable fundraising in the wake of the events of
September 11, 2001, in large measure propelled passage of §1011 of the USA
PATRIOT Act3.”); Id., at footnote 52 (“The Commission believes the necessary
implication of modifying the definition of ‘telemarketing’ in the USA PATRIOT
Act is to have all provisions of the [Telemarketing Sales] Rule apply to charitable
solicitations.”).
3

USA PATRIOT ACT, Pub. L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (Oct. 26, 2001) (the “Patriot
Act”). §1011(b)(3) of the Patriot Act specifically amended the definition of
“telemarketing” appearing in the Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse
Prevention Act (15 U.S.C. §§6101 et seq.) (the “Telemarketing Act”) at 15 U.S.C.
§6106(4) to include charitable telemarketing. §1011(b)(1) of the Patriot Act
amended 15 U.S.C. §6102(a)(2) of the Telemarketing Act directing that fraudulent
charitable solicitations be regulated as deceptive practices under the Telemarketing
Sales Rule. §1011(b)(2) of the Patriot Act added a new section to the
Telemarketing Act directing the Commission to include new requirements
governing charitable telemarketing within the abusive telemarketing acts or
practices provisions of the Telemarketing Sales Act.
8

Based upon the Commission’s own comments cited above, even if the
substantial government interest advanced by the Final TSR is assumed to be
prevention of fraud and abuse, an issue exists as to whether the Commission’s
divergent treatment of commercial and charitable telemarketers under the Final
TSR directly and materially advances such interest. As such, an issue also exists
as to whether the Final TSR meets the third part of the Central Hudson test.
B.
Is the Proposed Restriction on Commercial Free Speech Sufficiently
Narrowly Tailored?
Notwithstanding the foregoing analysis, it is the potential for the Final TSR
to effectuate a complete and utter prohibition on commercial free speech that gives
ACA the greatest concern. The fourth part of the Central Hudson test requires that
an otherwise permissible government regulation of commercial speech be narrowly
tailored. It is this narrowly tailored component of the Central Hudson test that
raises the most serious question for this Court to resolve.
It is clear that in regulating commercial speech, the government does not
need to employ the least restrictive means available. Board of Trustees of the State
University of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480, 109 S.Ct. 3028, 106 L.Ed.2d
388 (1989). However, as stated by the Court:
What our decisions require is a ‘fit’ between the legislature’s ends and
the means chosen to accomplish those ends…a fit that is not
necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the
single best disposition but one whose scope is in proportion to the
interest served…that employs not necessarily the least restrictive
9

means but, as we have put it in the other contexts described above, a
means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective.
Id. (Emphasis added; internal citations omitted).
A question clearly exists as to whether the national do-not-call registry
provisions are tailored narrowly enough to withstand analysis under Central
Hudson and Fox. This question is based upon a fundamental issue of whether a
regulatory framework that effectuates the potential for a complete and utter ban on
commercial free speech can by its very nature be considered “narrowly tailored.”
Similarly, is the national do-not-call registry, as currently structured, a
regulation “whose scope is in proportion to the interest served”? Fox, supra.
There is no question that the protection of consumer privacy rights is a substantial
government interest. That being said, ACA’s concern is the parade of horribles
that may result from a system that allows a consumer to preemptively and
completely shut the door on legitimate commercial speech, prior to even having
had the opportunity to know the content of the commercial speech.
Government restrictions on commercial speech are subject to an
intermediate level of scrutiny. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 573 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring). While the Fox Court held that the government is not required to use
the absolute least restrictive means to achieve its desired end, Fox, 492 U.S. at 480,
the Court certainly did not prohibit inquiry into whether less restrictive means are
available to meet the government’s goal in enacting the challenged restriction on
10

commercial speech. On the contrary, the Fox Court noted that “almost all of the
restrictions disallowed under Central Hudson’s fourth prong have been
substantially excessive, disregarding ‘far less restrictive and more precise means’”.
Fox, 492 U.S. 469. As such, in order to determine whether the Commission’s
regulation of commercial speech in the Final TSR is “reasonable”, “in proportion
to the interest served”, and “narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective” as
required by Fox, we must examine whether less restrictive means are available for
achieving the Commission’s goal of protecting consumers’ privacy rights with
regard to telemarketing calls.
II.
There are Less Restrictive Means Available that Would Serve the
Government’s Interests in Protecting Consumer Privacy Rights with Regard
to Telemarketing Calls
A.

The FDCPA’s Approach

As noted above, ACA is no stranger to severe restrictions on commercial
speech. Pursuant to the FDCPA, a consumer may unilaterally require a debt
collector to cease communications with the consumer concerning a particular debt
simply by notifying the debt collector in writing that the consumer refuses to pay
the debt or that the consumer desires the debt collector to cease further
communication with the consumer. 15 U.S.C. §1692c(c).
Once a consumer has so notified a debt collector, the debt collector may not
communicate further with the consumer with respect to the debt in question except:

11

(1) to advise the consumer that the debt collector’s further efforts are being
terminated; (2) to notify the consumer that the debt collector or creditor may
invoke specified remedies which are ordinarily invoked by such debt collector or
creditor; or (3) where applicable, to notify the consumer that the debt collector or
creditor intends to invoke a specified remedy. Id.
The FDCPA seems to strike a better balance between consumer rights and
the business community’s free speech rights than the Final TSR.

Under the

FDCPA, a debt collector has an absolute right to make an initial contact with a
consumer in order to attempt to collect money owed by the consumer based upon a
transaction initiated by the consumer with a creditor. Obviously, any attempt to
curtail this initial right of contact would have devastating consequences upon
creditors attempting to obtain payment for goods they had previously delivered or
services they had previously rendered to consumers.
Upon receipt of a debt collector’s initial communication, the consumer then
immediately obtains the right to cease any unwanted communications from the
debt collector pursuant to the provisions of 15 U.S.C. §1692c(c).
Upon receipt of a consumer’s written request to cease communication, the
debt collector must cease any and all communication with the consumer
concerning the debt except for one (1) of the three (3) limited exceptions set forth
in 15 U.S.C. §1692c(c).

12

Assuming the debt collector has invoked one (1) of the exceptions stated
above4 and made a final communication with the consumer, and the debt remains
unpaid, the debt collector now has a choice to make: either take appropriate legal
action to collect the debt in question, or cease all activity on the account in
question. One thing for certain at such juncture is that the debt collector absolutely
may not communicate further with the consumer concerning the debt in question
outside of the ambit of a legal proceeding.
ACA is convinced the FDCPA strikes an appropriate balance between the
rights of consumers and the commercial free speech rights of creditors and their
agents. As shown above, while the right to commercial free speech is severely
regulated under the FDCPA, there is no outright prohibition on commercial free
speech that would prevent a creditor or its agent from at least making an initial
communication attempting to collect money owed. In short, the consumer is
provided with an opportunity to determine the nature and potential value of the
communication, as well as the identity of the caller, thereby allowing the consumer
to make an informed decision as to whether he wishes to communicate further with
the caller, or to require the cessation of further communications concerning the
debt in question.
4

Although not required by the FDCPA, many debt collectors do not take
advantage of the extra communication allowed by 15 U.S.C. §1692c(c), choosing
instead to either initiate a legal proceeding or cease all activity on the debt in
question.
13

The Final TSR on the other hand, allows for a consumer to shut the door on
commercial free speech before any such speech has even occurred. As such, the
question becomes whether a complete prohibition on commercial free speech can
possibly be considered “a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired
objective” so as to withstand the requirement set forth in Fox?
B.
The Problems with the Company Specific Do-Not-Call Lists Have Been
Cured by the New Provisions of the Final TSR Requiring the Transmission of
Caller Identification Information
Clearly, the company-specific approach to do-not-call lists taken under the
original Telemarketing Sales Rule is far less restrictive than the national do-notcall registry adopted by the Final TSR. Under the company-specific approach, to
prevent telemarketing calls from a company, consumers had5 to request that a
specific company not contact the consumer any further.
According to the Commission, one of the problems encountered with the
company-specific do-not-call lists was that consumer attempts to sign up for such
lists were often frustrated by telemarketers.

The Commission described how

telemarketers would often hang up on consumers who requested to be added to the
telemarketer’s company-specific do-not-call list, with the net result being that the
consumer had no method for identifying which telemarketer had contacted him,
5

The company-specific approach to do-not-call lists is still employed in the final
TSR as the sole means for consumers to block receipt of telemarketing calls on
behalf of charities. 16 C.F.R. §310.4(b)(1)(iii)(A); 16 C.F.R. §310.6(a).
14

and consequently, no ability to make a formal request to be placed on such
telemarketer’s company-specific do-not-call list, or to identify a telemarketer who
has violated the provisions of the final TSR. 68 Fed. Reg. 4626-4628. These were
the main reasons advanced by the Commission for the new provision in the Final
TSR requiring all telemarketers to transmit caller identification information
(“Caller ID”) in every telemarketing call. Id.
In discussing its reasoning for requiring the transmission of Caller ID in all
telemarketing calls, the Commission also stated that “consumers will receive
substantial privacy protection as a result of this [Caller ID] provision.” 68 Fed.
Reg. 4623. The Commission continued:
Consumers benefit because Caller ID information allows them to
screen out unwanted callers and identify companies that have
contacted them so that they can place “do-not-call” requests to those
companies. These features of Caller ID enable consumers to protect
their privacy…The fact that consumers greatly value the privacy
protection provided by receipt of Caller ID information is evidenced
by the fact that, as of the year 2000, nearly half of all Americans
subscribed to a Caller ID service.
68 Fed. Reg. 4624 (footnote omitted).
The commentary to the final TSR seems to indicate that requiring the
transmission of Caller ID in all telemarketing calls achieves the same goals
advanced in support of the national do-not-call registry:
…consumers derive substantial benefit from receiving Caller ID
information…Consumers in large numbers subscribe to, and pay for,
Caller ID services offered by their telephone companies. Many of
15

these consumers subscribe to Caller ID specifically to identify
incoming calls from telemarketers and screen out unwanted
telemarketing calls…These consumers have, over time, come to the
conclusion that an incoming call that fails to provide Caller ID
information is commonly a telemarketing call. As a result, some
consumers decline to answer these calls.
68 Fed. Reg. 4626 (footnotes omitted). See also, 68 Fed. Reg. 4627, footnote 540
(“Consumer prefers current state of affairs where ‘most’ telemarketers block
transmission of Caller ID information because her Caller ID is programmed to
refuse calls from parties who block such transmission. Using this arrangement, the
consumer reports receiving few telemarketing calls.”)
By requiring the transmission of Caller ID information in every
telemarketing call, the biggest problems with the company-specific do-not-call lists
identified by the Commission have been cured. Now, even if a telemarketer
illegally frustrates a consumer’s attempt to be placed on the telemarketer’s
company-specific do-not-call list, the consumer will have a means for identifying
and reporting the offending telemarketer. This will allow the consumer to make a
formal request to be placed on the telemarketer’s company-specific do-not-call list,
and will also aid in identifying offending telemarketers for the purpose of actions
to enforce the provisions of the final TSR.
Based upon the foregoing, ACA suggests that a return to the companyspecific approach to do-not-call would resolve the issues presented in this appeal.
A return to this approach would surely cure the constitutional issues raised in
16

Judge Nottingham’s Order in D.C. No. 03-N-0184 (MJW)6 as all telemarketers
would be treated in the same manner.

Furthermore, the company-specific

approach to do-not-call lists is far less restrictive than the national do-not-call
registry provisions set forth in the Final TSR as the telemarketer is able to exercise
his commercial free speech rights unless and until the consumer invokes his right
to be placed on the telemarketer’s company-specific do-not-call list, thereby
effectuating a cessation of all communications from the telemarketer. This is an
approach similar to the approach taken by the FDCPA as described earlier in this
brief.
III.

Rowan Supports the Company-Specific Approach to Do-Not-Call Lists
Proponents of the national do-not-call registry provisions set forth in the

final TSR routinely point to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Rowan v. U.S.
Post Office Department, 397 U.S. 728, 90 S.Ct. 1484, 25 L.Ed.2d 736 (1970) as
constitutional support for the national do-not-call registry. Ironically, in actuality,
the Rowan decision provides constitutional support for the company-specific donot-call lists espoused in the original Telemarketing Sales Rule.
Rowan does not stand for the proposition that a consumer can preemptively
put a halt to any and all commercial speech. Quite to the contrary, pursuant to the
6

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER, Mainstream Marketing Services,
Inc., et al. v. Federal Trade Commission, et al., Civ. No. 03-N-0184 (MJW) (D.
Colo. Sept. 25, 2003) (“Judge Nottingham’s Order”).
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regulation under review in Rowan, a consumer could not request that further mail
from a particular vendor be ceased until the vendor had in fact mailed an
advertisement to the consumer. Rowan, 397 U.S. at 730, 734-735, 739; see also,
id., 397 U.S. at 739, footnote 6. Rowan, like the approach taken by the FDCPA
and the company-specific do-not-call list provisions in the original Telemarketing
Sales Rule, requires an affirmative request by a consumer to cease communication
from a particular party. In addition to being a far less restrictive curtailment of
commercial free speech than the national do-not-call registry provisions, such an
approach still achieves the government’s stated goal to protect consumer privacy
rights, as the consumer maintains the ability to require any or all telemarketers to
cease contacting the consumer.

As this alternative results in a regulation of

commercial free speech, as opposed to a complete prohibition on such speech,
ACA urges this Court to consider this solution or a similar alternative.
IV.

The Need to Guard Against Unintended Consequences of the Final TSR
Regulations at times seem to take on lives of their own. Many times, when a

new regulation is passed, it quickly becomes apparent that the new regulation has
unintended and undesirable consequences.
By way of example, and certainly not limitation, this is exactly what has
happened with the Federal Communications Commission’s (the “FCC”) recent
revisions to its regulations implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act,
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47 U.S.C. §227 (the “TCPA”). See, Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) of 1991; Final Rule, 68 Fed. Reg.
44144 (July 25, 2003).
In its rules implementing the TCPA, the FCC included restrictions
governing the use of prerecorded telephone messages. 47 C.F.R. §64.1200(b)
requires in pertinent part:
All artificial or prerecorded telephone messages shall: (1) At the
beginning of the message, state clearly the identity of the business,
individual, or other entity that is responsible for initiating the call.
If a business is responsible for initiating the call, the name under
which the entity is registered to conduct business with the State
Corporation Commission (or comparable regulatory authority) must
be stated…
47 C.F.R. §64.1200(b)(1) (emphasis added).
While this regulation seems innocuous enough on its face, the problem for
ACA members is that it is in direct conflict with 15 U.S.C. §1692c(b) of the
FDCPA. 15 U.S.C. §1692c(b) provides that:
…without the prior consent of the consumer given directly to the debt
collector, or the express permission of a court of competent
jurisdiction, or as reasonably necessary to effectuate a postjudgment
judicial remedy, a debt collector may not communicate, in connection
with the collection of any debt, with any person other than a
consumer, his attorney, a consumer reporting agency if otherwise
permitted by law, the creditor, the attorney of the creditor, or the
attorney of the debt collector.
15 U.S.C. §1692c(b) (emphasis added).
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Since many debt collection companies have names that indicate they are in
the debt collection business (i.e., ABC Collection Services, Inc.), many debt
collectors are faced with an impossible compliance scenario when leaving a
prerecorded telephone message.

If a debt collection company named ABC

Collection Services, Inc. leaves a prerecorded telephone message and complies
with 47 C.F.R. §64.1200(b)(1) of the FCC rules implementing the TCPA, the debt
collection company risks that a third party hears the prerecorded telephone
message thereby violating the third-party communication prohibition contained
within 15 U.S.C. §1692c(b) of the FDCPA.

Conversely, if the same debt

collection company, in an effort to comply with the FDCPA leaves a prerecorded
telephone message and does not identify the company’s name, the debt collection
company has violated 47 C.F.R. §64.1200(b)(1).
Simply put, ACA members have been placed in the untenable position of
choosing which federal law to comply with, the FDCPA or the TCPA. Ironically,
nothing in the administrative record of the FCC’s rules implementing the TCPA
indicates any intent to regulate debt collection activities. See, 68 Fed. Reg. 44144
et seq.

Yet, as described above, ACA members find themselves not only

potentially subject to the provisions of the TCPA, but also mired in a conflict
between the TCPA and the FDCPA. It is unintended consequences such as this
that ACA fears most with the Final TSR.
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V.

The Final TSR Must Remain Limited Solely to Telemarketing Calls
Obviously, limitations on free speech are always fraught with peril. Society

places a high value on the free exchange of ideas. As the Central Hudson Court
stated: “commercial expression not only serves the economic interest of the
speaker, but also assists consumers and furthers the societal interest in the fullest
possible dissemination of information.” Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561-562.
Due to the current structure of the national do-not-call registry, the
framework is in place to effectuate a complete ban on commercial free speech
espoused by telemarketers. Given the sweeping prohibitions on commercial free
speech which are allowed under the national do-not-call registry, as opposed to the
more narrowly tailored restrictions on commercial free speech allowed under the
FDCPA, ACA is concerned with ensuring that the final TSR never escapes the
strict confines of telemarketing calls in its scope and applicability.
Based upon the legal analysis contained in the Order entered by Judge
Nottingham in D.C. No. 03-N-0184 (MJW), as well as ACA’s own independent
legal research and analysis, ACA is concerned about the ramifications that may
ensue in the event that this Court affirms Judge Nottingham’s Order and finds the
Final TSR to be unconstitutional. Given the recent statements of various members
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of Congress7 concerning the strong Congressional desire for the national do-notcall registry to continue in effect as set forth in the final TSR, it seems certain that
Congressional reaction to this Court finding the national do-not-call registry to be
unconstitutional would be swift.
Judge Nottingham’s Order found the provisions of the Final TSR concerning
the establishment of the national do-not-call registry unconstitutional based upon
the disparate treatment afforded to charitable as opposed to commercial
telemarketers. As such, in the event that this Court affirms Judge Nottingham’s
decision, ACA feels there will be much debate within Congress over how to amend
the provisions of the Final TSR relating to the national do-not-call registry in order
to survive further constitutional attacks.
Under the final prong of the Central Hudson test requiring restrictions on
commercial free speech to be “narrowly tailored” to achieve a substantial
government interest, it would seem that a return to the company-specific approach
to do-not-call lists would pass constitutional muster. This is especially so in light
of the amendment to the final TSR requiring Caller ID information to be
transmitted in every telemarketing call. Such amendment appears to cure the
7

See, 149 Cong. Rec. H8916-17 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 2003) (statement of Rep.
Tauzin, “The FTC wants this [national do-not-call] list. The President of the
United States wants this list, and more importantly, 50 million Americans, who are
growing impatient about being interrupted at mealtime by unwanted and
unnecessary harassing telemarketing calls, want this list. And this Congress is
going to make sure they have this list today.”).
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concerns with company-specific do-not-call lists enumerated by the Commission in
the commentary to the final TSR (see discussion above in Section IIB of this brief).
A return to the company-specific approach would also serve as a regulation
or restriction of commercial free speech, as opposed to the current framework of
the national do-not-call registry, which acts more as a complete prohibition on
commercial free speech. The company-specific approach, which is similar to the
approach to commercial free speech restrictions espoused by the FDCPA, is also
supported by the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Rowan.
Another potential Congressional approach in response to this Court
upholding Judge Nottingham’s Order would be to amend the Final TSR by
repealing the exemption currently afforded to charitable telemarketers from the
provisions of the final TSR relating to the national do-not-call registry. Such a
revision would remove the problematic disparate treatment afforded to charitable
as opposed to commercial telemarketers in the current version of the final TSR.
However, such a revision clearly would not be as “narrowly tailored” as a return to
the company-specific approach to do-not-call lists. Such a revision would not
address the issue that as structured, the provisions of the national do-not-call
registry amount to a prohibition on commercial free speech as opposed to a
restriction upon commercial free speech.
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The approach to curing any unconstitutionality in the final TSR that
concerns ACA most would be any revision to the Final TSR that allowed the
provisions of the national do-not-call registry to spread beyond the strict confines
of telemarketing calls.

As the international trade association for credit and

collection professionals, ACA has a profound concern over any expansion of the
national do-not-call registry that would prevent creditors or their agents from
communicating with consumers in an effort to collect money for services
previously rendered or goods previously delivered.
It is clear that there is no intent to regulate debt collection calls in the final
TSR. 68 Fed. Reg. 4664, footnote 1020. However, as described above in Section
IV of this brief, regulations at times take on lives of their own. This often includes
expansion of the scope and applicability of the regulation in question. Expansion
of the Final TSR to cover activities by creditors and their agents would wreak
havoc upon the nation’s credit and collection system.8
In the event that the scope of the Final TSR were ever expanded to include
telephone calls from creditors and their agents, the most profound repercussion
would be that consumers would then have the ability to initiate a transaction for
goods or services, receive such goods or services, and then prevent any and all
8

While ACA does not believe that such a regulation could pass constitutional
muster, the potential for future amendments to the Final TSR necessitate a
discussion of the ramifications of such a regulation herein.
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collection calls simply by listing their telephone number on the national do-not-call
registry. Obviously, such an expansion of the Final TSR would severely hinder the
ability of creditors to receive payment for goods delivered and services rendered.
It is important to remember that collection calls from creditors and their
agents are calls made in response to a transaction that has been initiated by the
consumer. Unlike a telemarketing call, a collection call does not happen up front
in an attempt to entice a consumer into a business transaction. Rather, a collection
call occurs only after a consumer has initiated a transaction, the consumer has
received the goods or services that are the subject of the transaction, and the
consumer has failed to pay for the goods or services.
The Final TSR contemplates and addresses consumer-initiated transactions
by exempting from the Final TSR telephone calls initiated by the consumer that are
not the result of any solicitation.

16 C.F.R. §310.6(b)(4).

Similarly, most

telephone calls initiated by the consumer in response to direct solicitations that
provided the consumer with specified disclosures are also exempt from the Final
TSR. 16 C.F.R. §310.6(b)(6). As such, ACA respectfully suggests preventing the
scope of the Final TSR from ever expanding to include telephone calls from
creditors or their agents to collect money owed for consumer-initiated transactions.
As shown above, maintaining this existing limitation on the scope of the Final TSR
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comports with the manner in which the Final TSR already treats consumer initiated
telemarketing transactions.
CONCLUSION
The provisions of the Final TSR relating to the establishment of the national
do-not-call registry are unlike any prior government regulation on commercial free
speech in that they allow a consumer to preemptively block all communications
from a commercial telemarketer prior to the telemarketer even making an initial
communication.

This effectively blocks the flow of information prior to the

consumer even being made aware of the content of the communications being
blocked. This, together with the disparate treatment afforded to charitable as
opposed to commercial telemarketers, raises concerns about the constitutionality of
the Final TSR.
ACA suggests that the approach taken by the FDCPA in regulating thirdparty debt collection activities strikes the appropriate balance between the rights of
consumers and commercial free speech rights.

With the addition of the

requirement for the transmission of Caller ID information in every telemarketing
call, ACA further suggests that the company-specific approach to do-not-call lists
also strikes such a balance.
In sum, the FDCPA and the company-specific approach to do-not-call lists
both effect restrictions upon commercial free speech. On the other hand, the
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provisions of the Final TSR relating to the national do-not-call registry allow for a
complete prohibition of commercial free speech.
Based upon the above, ACA respectfully suggests that it is imperative that
the scope and applicability of the provisions of the Final TSR remain strictly
confined to telemarketing calls.
Dated this 28th day of October, 2003.
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